But they were willing to surrender. They had said so numerous times. It is highly wuestionable that it was going to take an atomic bomb or an invasion to nudge it from conditional to unconditional surrender.
We have statements by their officials at the time that suggest otherwise. The ones in our service who argued against the need for the weapon would have otherwise continued naval bombardment//blockade and continued fire bombing in populated cities. if they decided not to go ahead with Operation Downfall.
Japan's geography made this invasion plan quite obvious to the Japanese as well; they were able to predict the Allied invasion plans accurately and thus adjust their defensive plan, Operation KetsugÅ, accordingly. The Japanese planned an all-out defense of KyÅ«shÅ«, with little left in reserve for any subsequent defense operations. Casualty predictions varied widely but were extremely high for both sides: depending on the degree to which Japanese civilians resisted the invasion, estimates ran into the millions for Allied casualties[1] and several times that number for total Japanese casualties.
For the most part, Suzuki's military-dominated cabinet favored continuing the war. For the Japanese, surrender was unthinkable-Japan had never been invaded or lost a war in its history.[17] Only Mitsumasa Yonai, the Navy minister, was known to desire an early end to the war.
By the end of January 1945, the Japanese were suggesting peace terms.[23] These proposals, sent through both British and American channels, were assembled by General Douglas MacArthur into a 40-page dossier and given to President Franklin D. Roosevelt on February 2, two days before the Yalta Conference. Reportedly, the dossier was dismissed by Roosevelt out of hand-the proposals all included the condition that the emperor's position would be assured, if possibly as a puppet ruler; at this point the Allied policy was to accept only an unconditional surrender.[24] Additionally, these proposals were strongly opposed by powerful military members of the Japanese government.[25]
speaking in the name of the cabinet, TÅgÅ repeated
With regard to unconditional surrender we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. ... It is in order to avoid such a state of affairs that we are seeking a peace, ... through the good offices of Russia. ... it would also be disadvantageous and impossible, from the standpoint of foreign and domestic considerations, to make an immediate declaration of specific terms
The targeting committee's list included 18 Japanese cities. At the top of the list were Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama, Kokura, and Niigata.[61][62] Ultimately, Kyoto was removed from the list at the insistence of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, who had visited the city on his honeymoon and knew of its cultural and historical significance.
Read the sections
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan
The Potsdam Declaration
Japanese reaction
At 2/11/13 03:28 AM, Ceratisa wrote:
Um to correct you Camar they knew if the weapons would work. In the very least since trinity worked, so they knew Fat Man would.
They didn't know fat man would work.
Yes they did, the first nuclear bomb tested (Trinity) worked and it was the same design. The first one dropped (Little Boy) was untested but considered likely to work because it was so much simpler.