Rumsfeld's Reversal on Iraq

[Ranger2]

Although a little late to the game, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called the addition of democracy in Iraq "unrealistic."

It's not a complete reversal of what Rumsfeld believed in 2003, but it is a reversal of part of what he said.

First off, let's make one thing clear: Rumsfeld's control over the Iraqi political infrastructure ended in May 2003 with the arrival of Paul Bremer. The direct administration of Iraq until 2004 was not Rumsfeld's idea, but State Dept. official Paul Bremer. The two constantly clashed about policy in Iraq, with Rumsfeld arguing that the approach was too heavy handed.

So here's the reversal and lack thereof.

Consistent: Rumsfeld from the beginning called for a hands-off approach in Iraq. He believed that the US could not implant its system and that the Iraqis must be allowed to form their own form of government. He envisioned toppling Saddam and leaving by the end of summer 2003.

Flip Flop: Rumsfeld never said that American-style democracy was realistic, but he believed that democracy itself in Iraq was realistic. Rumsfeld never imagined a United States of Iraq, but he did imagine that the Iraqis would form democratic political parties and govern themselves effectively after Saddam Hussein, which turned out to be disastrously false. When Iraqis were looting Baghdad, Rumsfeld called it "catastrophic success" and claimed that "freedom's untidy." In his memoirs he compared the looting of Iraq to the chaos in Germany after WWII.

Ultimately, Rumsfeld's and Bremer's plans were both given the chance to fail. At this point in time Rumsfeld's revisionism won't do any good. His counterpart Paul Bremer still insists that Iraq is better off today than it was on March 18, 2003.

I guess I'll leave it with this question: Was democracy ever a possible outcome in Iraq? If yes, how could it have been done? If no, where do we go from here if we abandon democracy in Iraq?

[Ranger2]

At 6/9/15 04:54 PM, Korriken wrote: When you're dealing with primitive minded tribals who insistently hate and oppress each other when given the chance, there is no chance for democracy to work because the moment one group attains power, they're going to feverishly work towards consolidating power and shutting out the opposition.

It's not as simple as that. I'm not going to argue that the Iraqis were naturally going to go toward a liberal, tolerant democracy, but the conditions were not there. Saddam's biggest area of support was in fact Anbar province, the home of countless tribes. But the US failed to fill the power vacuum, which allowed tribalism and religious leaders--who previously had been suppressed under Saddam--the rule.

[Warforger]

The biggest mistake was dissolving the Ba'athist army. Yes, let's lay off an entire army of trained soldiers who now have nothing to lose and who hate you, it'll be great. These soldiers now fight for ISIS as well as the other insurgent groups previous to ISIS that plagued the US. The US should've done what Nehru did in India after independence; gather together all the regional leaders and elites and give everyone a stake in the government. When the US dissolved the Ba'athist army it granted none of them a stake in the government, only an incentive to turn hostile toward it. Now many of these fight for ISIS just so they can have enough income to support themselves. This is the same with the Free Syrian Army, many soldiers have defected to Al-Nursa and ISIS because they're paid better if they do and can support their families more. Because that's ultimately what it's all about, you can be a Communist, you can be the most radical Salafi Muslim, people here care first and foremost about their families and their tribe more than anything and if you don't provide them with income they won't fight for you.