At 10/20/08 11:23 AM, Brian wrote:
I would agree if I didn't know more about programming. Its entirely likely that if the voting machine itself is compromised then the vote would be stored wrong immediately and printed out wrong as well. It would certainly make it more difficult to commit fraud, as people could check their reciept, but that is the only way a difference would be found. The paper would likely register the same information as the electronic version, otherwise it would be traceable.
That's an interesting point. I could see a system set up like this:
1. The first machine has a graphical user interface, and accepts the person's vote.
2. The second machine is a separate unit that is connected to the first machine with a single wire. The first machine tells the second machine to print a paper ballot for the electronic vote.
3. The voter turns in their paper ballot and leaves.
4. The votes are counted up, and the paper ballot is compared with the electronic ballot to see that they match up.
This system would be near fool proof, because if the two votes don't match their the voter is instantly alerted to the tampering. The only way to hack the system would be to tamper with paper ballots and the electronic ballots simultaneously after they leave the system.
Very tough.
Any "malfunctioning/tampered" code that worked differently per user would have to be probablistic in nature or time bombed. The chance of that kind system being involved and not caught seems unlikely to me, as does a bunch of programmers going along with a project like that silently, though its not impossible.
Right. And I think having a dual paper-electronic system reduces the risk enormously. You can't just modify the first machine that collects the persons votes, and make it so that it switches the vote, because then the second machine will tell the person of the vote tampering. You can't just switch both machines, because then the paper ballot and the electronic message won't align with each other.
Machines can be trusted to always do what they've been programmed to do. People can't be trusted to program ethically or correctly and its up to the individual states to run a series of tests to guarantee that everything is working, that the network is closed and that the hardware/software works correctly. I believe its entirely possible that the states don't have the man power or the understanding to do this correctly.
Yeah, but I think that the risks can be minimal. I mean, if you had a machine that printed the paper ballot separate from the machine that takes the voter's input, then prints a paper ballot and sends an electronic message to a separate voting center.
I really don't see how someone could break the system because if the ballot prints the wrong name, then the voter is easily alerted to the tampering.
And on a neat/irrelevant side note, there's a cryptography expert at my school who said that there are devices that can read a computer screen from a pretty big distance by detecting the magnetic fields. Crazy stuff.